Altruism: a brief
history
Almost everyone wants to be an altruist, and most of us lament the fact that we are not more altruistic than we are. Non-altruists feel an urge to justify their behaviour to the rest of us, and perhaps they show a little altruism in doing even that. The number of people in the world who unashamedly celebrate their egoistic behaviour is rather small. In this short book we investigate what this thing is that so many of us want to be. Is altruism the morally best thing? Not always, as we shall see.
Altruism is a simple idea. Many concepts in philosophy and the social sciences, by contrast, are quite complex. In some cases they arose only with specific forms of social and economic organization and can only be understood in these contexts (think of socialism or citizenship or the state). With others, their adher- ents argue vehemently over the best conceptions of the basic concept and competing theories are constructed under common names: democracy, social justice, or multiculturalism, for exam- ple. Other concepts are not complex but are subject to denials, on the part of their enemies, that there is any value or utility in them at all: postmodernism, welfare, or nationalism, for example. Altruism is not like these cases. It is valued by (almost) everyone and its core meaning universally agreed. Altruism, in its broadest sense, means promoting the interests of the other. That, at least, was what was first meant by the idea. The French term ‘altru- isme’ was coined by Auguste Comte in his Système de Politique Positive ([1851] 1969–70): it combined the Latin alter with ui and literally meant ‘to this other’. The English ‘altruism’ was first introduced into Britain by George H. Lewes, a popularizer of Comte’s work, in 1853 (Brosnahan 1907). Altruism, as Comte
Almost everyone wants to be an altruist, and most of us lament the fact that we are not more altruistic than we are. Non-altruists feel an urge to justify their behaviour to the rest of us, and perhaps they show a little altruism in doing even that. The number of people in the world who unashamedly celebrate their egoistic behaviour is rather small. In this short book we investigate what this thing is that so many of us want to be. Is altruism the morally best thing? Not always, as we shall see.
Altruism is a simple idea. Many concepts in philosophy and the social sciences, by contrast, are quite complex. In some cases they arose only with specific forms of social and economic organization and can only be understood in these contexts (think of socialism or citizenship or the state). With others, their adher- ents argue vehemently over the best conceptions of the basic concept and competing theories are constructed under common names: democracy, social justice, or multiculturalism, for exam- ple. Other concepts are not complex but are subject to denials, on the part of their enemies, that there is any value or utility in them at all: postmodernism, welfare, or nationalism, for example. Altruism is not like these cases. It is valued by (almost) everyone and its core meaning universally agreed. Altruism, in its broadest sense, means promoting the interests of the other. That, at least, was what was first meant by the idea. The French term ‘altru- isme’ was coined by Auguste Comte in his Système de Politique Positive ([1851] 1969–70): it combined the Latin alter with ui and literally meant ‘to this other’. The English ‘altruism’ was first introduced into Britain by George H. Lewes, a popularizer of Comte’s work, in 1853 (Brosnahan 1907). Altruism, as Comte
2 Altruism
intended it (see below), is therefore a moral concept, indeed this
may seem to be its central usage.
However, while altruism is an elemental moral idea, it is, nonetheless, embroiled in some thorny questions of right and wrong. Consider the racist organ donor, for example, who wishes to donate their organs, but only to those of their own race, regardless of the need others may have. They are altruistic, but hardly moral. Moreover, while it is easy to condemn this person’s racism, consider the huge sums charitably donated by US citizens to beneficiaries in their own society who are, by global standards, still quite well off. This altruism may not be racist, but it still arguably offends the moral ideal of impartiality. Further problems stem from the self-sacrificial element bound up with the vernacu- lar understanding of altruism. Consider the heroes who rescue children from the proverbial burning building or – an important real life case we consider in Chapter 4 – rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. Did such people have a duty to incur these risks? If they did not, then should they have displayed such heroism? If they did, then does altruism sometimes ask too much of us? If we believe that some sacrifice of one’s own interests for others can be required then we need to know how much can reasonably be asked for.
Altruism is a general phenomenon that involves taking the interests of the other as one’s own; it is often identified with the Golden Rule (present in many religious and ethical traditions as we shall shortly see) – do unto others as you would have them do unto you. The Golden Rule seems to identify altruism with morality, but it is far from clear whether acting from the golden rule is always moral. Hobbes endorsed the Golden Rule, but interpreted it egoistically: a person first decides how they want to be treated and then they treat others on this basis. How about the masochist, for example, or religious zealots, or others with peculiar tastes which they would like ‘altruistically’ to share with others. Altruism, to make the point a final time, is a fundamen- tally simple idea but (perhaps for that reason) its implications and its association with morality, are far from simple. Investigating altruism, may seem a bit like taking a sweater apart to see what it is made of, leaving us with all yarn and no sweater. In this book we shall do some of this unstitching, but in a way that tries to preserve what is left.
may seem to be its central usage.
However, while altruism is an elemental moral idea, it is, nonetheless, embroiled in some thorny questions of right and wrong. Consider the racist organ donor, for example, who wishes to donate their organs, but only to those of their own race, regardless of the need others may have. They are altruistic, but hardly moral. Moreover, while it is easy to condemn this person’s racism, consider the huge sums charitably donated by US citizens to beneficiaries in their own society who are, by global standards, still quite well off. This altruism may not be racist, but it still arguably offends the moral ideal of impartiality. Further problems stem from the self-sacrificial element bound up with the vernacu- lar understanding of altruism. Consider the heroes who rescue children from the proverbial burning building or – an important real life case we consider in Chapter 4 – rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. Did such people have a duty to incur these risks? If they did not, then should they have displayed such heroism? If they did, then does altruism sometimes ask too much of us? If we believe that some sacrifice of one’s own interests for others can be required then we need to know how much can reasonably be asked for.
Altruism is a general phenomenon that involves taking the interests of the other as one’s own; it is often identified with the Golden Rule (present in many religious and ethical traditions as we shall shortly see) – do unto others as you would have them do unto you. The Golden Rule seems to identify altruism with morality, but it is far from clear whether acting from the golden rule is always moral. Hobbes endorsed the Golden Rule, but interpreted it egoistically: a person first decides how they want to be treated and then they treat others on this basis. How about the masochist, for example, or religious zealots, or others with peculiar tastes which they would like ‘altruistically’ to share with others. Altruism, to make the point a final time, is a fundamen- tally simple idea but (perhaps for that reason) its implications and its association with morality, are far from simple. Investigating altruism, may seem a bit like taking a sweater apart to see what it is made of, leaving us with all yarn and no sweater. In this book we shall do some of this unstitching, but in a way that tries to preserve what is left.
Altruism: a brief history 3
We shall consider altruism from a number of disciplinary
perspectives since it is in the engagement between its moral
meaning and these perspectives that the most interesting ques-
tions about altruism lie. Besides ethics, then, we shall explore the
contributions of evolutionary biology, psychology, anthropology,
economics and political science, to the study of altruism. All of
these disciplines have advanced our understanding of the nature
of altruism, even if some of them – in particular evolutionary
biology and economics – have expressed some scepticism over
whether it genuinely exists. In the remainder of this chapter we
shall survey the history of altruism in moral thought. Although
the term altruism is a nineteenth century one, the concept has a
long pedigree. The historical excavation of altruism’s meanings
will reveal how different thinkers construed the relative value of
altruism and egoism, and the relationship between altruism and
morality in a diversity of ways. One important issue which affects
the latter is whether we believe that when people act in altruistic
and/or moral ways they are motivated principally by reasons or by
their emotions. This is the subject of intense debate among
ethicists, and we explore it in Chapter 2. As we shall see there,
one’s view of whether the needs of others are thought to provide
reasons for action, or touch us in more empathetic ways, also
influences our view of reciprocity (a concept closely related to
altruism) and impartiality, the view that every person’s interests
count the same – we consider these too.
In Chapter 3, we examine whether humans engaged in evolu- tionary struggle can remain altruistic. At first blush, there is a tension between the other-regardingness which altruism involves and the ‘survival of the fittest’ which evolution forces upon us. Evolutionists of various stripes have developed sophisticated models to explain the abundant evidence we have that humans and other animals do engage in behaviour that puts others first. These models are suggestive, especially when they seek to explain the evolutionary and anthropological origins of morality, but ultimately we reject the evolutionary approach since it bypasses perhaps the most distinctive feature of altruism in human beings: a person’s motivation to assist another.
Chapter 4 considers a discipline which does have motivation at its centre: social pyschology. Most pyschologists make similar assumptions about the self-interested roots of human behaviour, but some of the more interesting work in pyschology investigates
In Chapter 3, we examine whether humans engaged in evolu- tionary struggle can remain altruistic. At first blush, there is a tension between the other-regardingness which altruism involves and the ‘survival of the fittest’ which evolution forces upon us. Evolutionists of various stripes have developed sophisticated models to explain the abundant evidence we have that humans and other animals do engage in behaviour that puts others first. These models are suggestive, especially when they seek to explain the evolutionary and anthropological origins of morality, but ultimately we reject the evolutionary approach since it bypasses perhaps the most distinctive feature of altruism in human beings: a person’s motivation to assist another.
Chapter 4 considers a discipline which does have motivation at its centre: social pyschology. Most pyschologists make similar assumptions about the self-interested roots of human behaviour, but some of the more interesting work in pyschology investigates
4 Altruism
the kinds of personalities (or ‘traits’) and circumstances (or
‘states’) in which altruistic motives are engaged. Studies show
that people like helping those like themselves. But in emergency
situations, especially when it is not clear who should be doing the
helping, individuals will go to enormous lengths to avoid aiding a
stranger. Notwithstanding this, we also discuss the research on
one of the most inspiring group of altruists there are, rescuers of
Jews in Nazi Europe. We consider whether socialization and
family background explains the enormous risks they took, or
whether there is, as Kristen Monroe argues in her important book,
The Heart of Altruism (1996), a distinct perspective on human
social life that only altruists possess.
Chapter 5 begins by considering the contribution of economic thought to the study of altruism. Many economists make assump- tions about the self-interested nature of individuals, though this has not prevented them from explaining why we exhibit altruism too. We argue, however, that this reveals more about theoretical weaknesses of the dominant rational choice model of individual behaviour that most of them work with than it does about the reality of social behaviour. After considering again ideas of reciprocity and exchange (closely related to altruism not just for economists, but also for early anthropologists, such as Malinowski and Mauss), the chapter examines in some detail the arguments for altruism found in Richard Titmuss’s classic work of social policy, The Gift Relationship ([1970] 1997). Titmuss’s work offers a powerful socialist-communitarian defence of the welfare state still of relevance today, though we argue that he is ambivalent over whether giving or exchange is at the heart of it. The chapter concludes by analysing whether states are avenues for altruism or, on the contrary, institutions which crowd out people’s other-regarding motivations.
In the final chapter, we take up again the question of whether the evolutionary perspective is combinable with a genuinely moral altruism and argue that a basic tension remains. Moreover, much of the in-group altruism in contemporary social life is, we maintain, morally suspect just because the favour it bestows on one’s own community is incompatible with the impartial demands of morality. We explore whether communitarian altruism, an antidote to the selfishness of today’s market societies, is extend- able to citizens and strangers, and express some scepticism over whether it is. Altruism and justice, we want to say, are two
Chapter 5 begins by considering the contribution of economic thought to the study of altruism. Many economists make assump- tions about the self-interested nature of individuals, though this has not prevented them from explaining why we exhibit altruism too. We argue, however, that this reveals more about theoretical weaknesses of the dominant rational choice model of individual behaviour that most of them work with than it does about the reality of social behaviour. After considering again ideas of reciprocity and exchange (closely related to altruism not just for economists, but also for early anthropologists, such as Malinowski and Mauss), the chapter examines in some detail the arguments for altruism found in Richard Titmuss’s classic work of social policy, The Gift Relationship ([1970] 1997). Titmuss’s work offers a powerful socialist-communitarian defence of the welfare state still of relevance today, though we argue that he is ambivalent over whether giving or exchange is at the heart of it. The chapter concludes by analysing whether states are avenues for altruism or, on the contrary, institutions which crowd out people’s other-regarding motivations.
In the final chapter, we take up again the question of whether the evolutionary perspective is combinable with a genuinely moral altruism and argue that a basic tension remains. Moreover, much of the in-group altruism in contemporary social life is, we maintain, morally suspect just because the favour it bestows on one’s own community is incompatible with the impartial demands of morality. We explore whether communitarian altruism, an antidote to the selfishness of today’s market societies, is extend- able to citizens and strangers, and express some scepticism over whether it is. Altruism and justice, we want to say, are two
Altruism: a brief history 5
different ideas. The chapter concludes by taking up again Mon-
roe’s idea of an altruistic perspective. We argue that the altruistic
perspective, which unites reasons and emotion, is a distinctive
view of human life and of morals and one which we ought to try
to cultivate. We offer some small scale examples of how this
might be achieved. Altruism, we conclude, though it has a more
limited role in social life than many would like, remains funda-
mental for a human future.
Aristotelian and religious altruism
Altruism and morals have an intertwined history. Aristotle, with whom (together with Plato) so many moral questions start, certainly had a conception of something that looks much like altruism. This occurs in his discussion of friendship. Friendship, for Aristotle, contains components of altruism in that it is a relationship where one wishes good for one’s friend for their sake (Aristotle 1976: 452). Aristotle was interested in whether good men act for the benefit of others or for themselves. This is a question about people’s motives in ethical behaviour, of course, but it is also about the objects of our behaviour: self or other. Aristotle recognizes that people often seek to benefit their friends but also to benefit themselves. Selfishness, he goes on to point out, in the Nichomachean Ethics, is often treated as an attribute of the bad man (Aristotle 1976: 454). But things are not so simple, because in acting in a way that is motivated by the interests of one’s friends one is acting both for the friend’s sake and, by an extension of one’s feeling, for oneself. Each person is, Aristotle thought, a sort of friend to themselves, and thus he blurs the distinction so central today between self and other. (He is not concerned with our obligations to strangers, something simply beyond his moral purview.)
Aristotle draws a distinction between self-love that is virtuous and self-love that is contrary to virtue, such as pure self- gratification. The pursuit of virtue involves developing oneself as a virtuous person: in acting (as we would term it) altruistically so as to benefit one’s friends, a person promotes virtue in themselves and so becomes a better person. But if even altruism has a concern for self at its centre, the question arises of whether it is genuinely possible to be motivated solely out of a regard for the other’s interests? According to Aristotle: ‘It is true to say of the
Aristotelian and religious altruism
Altruism and morals have an intertwined history. Aristotle, with whom (together with Plato) so many moral questions start, certainly had a conception of something that looks much like altruism. This occurs in his discussion of friendship. Friendship, for Aristotle, contains components of altruism in that it is a relationship where one wishes good for one’s friend for their sake (Aristotle 1976: 452). Aristotle was interested in whether good men act for the benefit of others or for themselves. This is a question about people’s motives in ethical behaviour, of course, but it is also about the objects of our behaviour: self or other. Aristotle recognizes that people often seek to benefit their friends but also to benefit themselves. Selfishness, he goes on to point out, in the Nichomachean Ethics, is often treated as an attribute of the bad man (Aristotle 1976: 454). But things are not so simple, because in acting in a way that is motivated by the interests of one’s friends one is acting both for the friend’s sake and, by an extension of one’s feeling, for oneself. Each person is, Aristotle thought, a sort of friend to themselves, and thus he blurs the distinction so central today between self and other. (He is not concerned with our obligations to strangers, something simply beyond his moral purview.)
Aristotle draws a distinction between self-love that is virtuous and self-love that is contrary to virtue, such as pure self- gratification. The pursuit of virtue involves developing oneself as a virtuous person: in acting (as we would term it) altruistically so as to benefit one’s friends, a person promotes virtue in themselves and so becomes a better person. But if even altruism has a concern for self at its centre, the question arises of whether it is genuinely possible to be motivated solely out of a regard for the other’s interests? According to Aristotle: ‘It is true to say of the
6 Altruism
man of good character that he performs many actions for the sake
of his friends and his country and if necessary even dies for them.
For he will sacrifice both money and honours and in general the
goods that people struggle to obtain in pursuit of what is morally
fine’ (Aristotle 1981: 456). In this passage Aristotle shows us that
virtuous (altruistic) action does not merely benefit one’s friends.
As we shall see later on, one could do that on a whim or caprice.
Virtuous action is rational moral action in pursuit of that which, in
addition to the good it does its beneficiaries (one’s friends), is
also ‘morally fine’. How the former motive relates to the latter
one is an interesting question.
Part of the ethical tradition of both Judaism and Christianity is the importance of promoting the interests of the other, expressed in terms of the love of one’s neighbour. For both traditions, this is an important point of departure for moral behaviour. The com- mandment in Leviticus to ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ was written as a command against revenge (Leviticus, ch.19, v.18); and expands on the commandment not to covet one’s neighbours’ possessions or give false testimony against one’s neighbour (Exo- dus, ch.20, v.16–7). These commandments amount to an ethic of how one ought to treat others in a manner that secures their interests, but they also relate to one’s own perception of how one would want to be treated, and thus they involve ideas of reciproc- ity (to which we shall return). This eventually became known as the Golden Rule. In the Jewish rabbinic tradition, the phrase the ‘Golden Rule’ is not thought to have come into use until the eighteenth century, but it originates in the Talmud:
A certain heathen came to Shammai and said to him: ‘Make me a proselyte, on condition that you teach me the whole Torah while I stand on one foot’. Thereupon he repulsed him with the rod which was in his hand. When he went to Hillel, he said to him, ‘what is hateful to you do not do to your neighbour: that is the whole Torah; all the rest of it is commentary; go and learn’.
(Talmud, Shabbat, 31a)
In Matthew and Luke, the Golden Rule is given in positive terms as, ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ (Matthew, ch.7, v.12; Luke, ch.6, v.31). In the gospels, Jesus, addressing his disciples at the last supper exhorts them to: ‘Love
Part of the ethical tradition of both Judaism and Christianity is the importance of promoting the interests of the other, expressed in terms of the love of one’s neighbour. For both traditions, this is an important point of departure for moral behaviour. The com- mandment in Leviticus to ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ was written as a command against revenge (Leviticus, ch.19, v.18); and expands on the commandment not to covet one’s neighbours’ possessions or give false testimony against one’s neighbour (Exo- dus, ch.20, v.16–7). These commandments amount to an ethic of how one ought to treat others in a manner that secures their interests, but they also relate to one’s own perception of how one would want to be treated, and thus they involve ideas of reciproc- ity (to which we shall return). This eventually became known as the Golden Rule. In the Jewish rabbinic tradition, the phrase the ‘Golden Rule’ is not thought to have come into use until the eighteenth century, but it originates in the Talmud:
A certain heathen came to Shammai and said to him: ‘Make me a proselyte, on condition that you teach me the whole Torah while I stand on one foot’. Thereupon he repulsed him with the rod which was in his hand. When he went to Hillel, he said to him, ‘what is hateful to you do not do to your neighbour: that is the whole Torah; all the rest of it is commentary; go and learn’.
(Talmud, Shabbat, 31a)
In Matthew and Luke, the Golden Rule is given in positive terms as, ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ (Matthew, ch.7, v.12; Luke, ch.6, v.31). In the gospels, Jesus, addressing his disciples at the last supper exhorts them to: ‘Love
Altruism: a brief history 7
one another as I have loved you. No one has greater love than this
than to lay down one’s life for one’s friends’ (John, ch.15,
v.12–3), which is repeated in John, ch.3, v.16. Here again, as in
Aristotle, we have the ultimate expression of love for another in
terms of being prepared to sacrifice one’s life.
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the phenomenon of altruism involves taking the interests of another as the goal of one’s actions, not only in relation to the expression of love of another human being, but also as an expression of love to God, so ‘the other’ involves the Divine as well. It must be noted that the Golden Rule is not unique to this tradition, but is found in many other religions as well. For example, the Hindu Mahabharata holds that: ‘One should not behave towards others in a way which is disagreeable to oneself. This is the essence of morality. All other activities are due to selfish desire’ (Mahabharata, Asusa- nasa Parva, 113.8). Confucianism instructs each person to: ‘Try your best to treat others as you would wish to be treated yourself, and you will find that this is the shortest way to benevolence’ (Mencius, VII.A.4).
In the medieval period, Aquinas explored Aristotelian thought on virtue, where in addition to the Christian ethic of charity, courage was an important component too in pursuing happiness and the good in being virtuous (Aquinas 1964: II–II.129.2). Indeed, as Jordan points out, for Aquinas there is no virtue without charity since the highest human end is supernatural and cannot be realized without charity (Jordan 1993: 242). This is especially the case when one is confronted with the need to perform an act that is likely to endanger oneself physically or harm other things that one values. However, this kind of action is only virtuous if the actor reflects upon the danger or risk involved in the act. The spontaneous act is not praiseworthy (Aquinas 1964: II–II.123.1.2). The elements of risk and danger in virtuous action are components of that certain kind of altruistic action that is defined by sacrifice or by the need for the agent to give something up in performing the act. This action is, for Aquinas, directed ultimately towards the end of achieving divinity.
He assumes that with the love of charity, the truly courageous direct their intentions, both proximate and remote, to God (Aqui- nas 1964: II–II.123.7; I–II.65.2). He assumes that with the benefit of the Holy Spirit’s gift of courage they act confidently and without fear, certain that they will finish whatever difficult work
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the phenomenon of altruism involves taking the interests of another as the goal of one’s actions, not only in relation to the expression of love of another human being, but also as an expression of love to God, so ‘the other’ involves the Divine as well. It must be noted that the Golden Rule is not unique to this tradition, but is found in many other religions as well. For example, the Hindu Mahabharata holds that: ‘One should not behave towards others in a way which is disagreeable to oneself. This is the essence of morality. All other activities are due to selfish desire’ (Mahabharata, Asusa- nasa Parva, 113.8). Confucianism instructs each person to: ‘Try your best to treat others as you would wish to be treated yourself, and you will find that this is the shortest way to benevolence’ (Mencius, VII.A.4).
In the medieval period, Aquinas explored Aristotelian thought on virtue, where in addition to the Christian ethic of charity, courage was an important component too in pursuing happiness and the good in being virtuous (Aquinas 1964: II–II.129.2). Indeed, as Jordan points out, for Aquinas there is no virtue without charity since the highest human end is supernatural and cannot be realized without charity (Jordan 1993: 242). This is especially the case when one is confronted with the need to perform an act that is likely to endanger oneself physically or harm other things that one values. However, this kind of action is only virtuous if the actor reflects upon the danger or risk involved in the act. The spontaneous act is not praiseworthy (Aquinas 1964: II–II.123.1.2). The elements of risk and danger in virtuous action are components of that certain kind of altruistic action that is defined by sacrifice or by the need for the agent to give something up in performing the act. This action is, for Aquinas, directed ultimately towards the end of achieving divinity.
He assumes that with the love of charity, the truly courageous direct their intentions, both proximate and remote, to God (Aqui- nas 1964: II–II.123.7; I–II.65.2). He assumes that with the benefit of the Holy Spirit’s gift of courage they act confidently and without fear, certain that they will finish whatever difficult work
8 Altruism
they begin and mindful of the insignificance of the goods they put
at risk when compared to the everlasting they hope to achieve
(Aquinas 1964: II–II.139.1; Bowlin 1999).
Having everlasting life or divinity as an end again brings into question the motivational state of the agent in understanding the nature of altruism. A common criticism of Christian altruism is that it is not really altruistic at all. The action is performed with the primary motivation coming from the possibility of reward of everlasting life. At any rate, altruism was certainly not yet understood in the way we think of it today.
Thomas Hobbes: egoism and its critics
In the mid-1600s, Thomas Hobbes argued for a view of human nature starkly at odds with moralities centred on other-regarding behaviour. The tradition of natural law which dominated the work of Aquinas and the scholastic tradition continued for other schol- ars, and is evident in some of Hobbes writing, but Hobbes’s main aim was to appeal to intellect and reason as the foundation of morality. According to Hobbes, there was no transcendent norma- tive order; rather humans had to create their own order to suit their biological and psychological natures. Political society was structured by the individualist need for survival. Hobbes’ empiricist theory of morality presented humans as motivated by self-interest, stemming from his view of humans constantly striv- ing to satisfy their own selfish desires, of which the main desire was, of necessity, survival.
Hobbes retained some notion of natural law, which for him amounted to the ability to exercise freedom in placing one’s own interests above that of another, thus generating competition and the opportunity for exploitation. To prevent this outcome, Hobbes argued that human beings, despite being governed by subjective preferences and their own self-interest would, through means– ends reasoning, recognize certain common interests. These, he believed, would be adopted in order for individuals to maximize their own security. Thus Hobbes arrived at a list of natural laws, of which the last was, interestingly enough, the Golden Rule. ‘The Lawes of Nature therefore need not any publishing nor Proclamation; as being contained in this one Sentence, approved by all the world, Do not that to another, which thou thinketh unreasonable to be done by another to thy selfe’ (Hobbes [1651]
Having everlasting life or divinity as an end again brings into question the motivational state of the agent in understanding the nature of altruism. A common criticism of Christian altruism is that it is not really altruistic at all. The action is performed with the primary motivation coming from the possibility of reward of everlasting life. At any rate, altruism was certainly not yet understood in the way we think of it today.
Thomas Hobbes: egoism and its critics
In the mid-1600s, Thomas Hobbes argued for a view of human nature starkly at odds with moralities centred on other-regarding behaviour. The tradition of natural law which dominated the work of Aquinas and the scholastic tradition continued for other schol- ars, and is evident in some of Hobbes writing, but Hobbes’s main aim was to appeal to intellect and reason as the foundation of morality. According to Hobbes, there was no transcendent norma- tive order; rather humans had to create their own order to suit their biological and psychological natures. Political society was structured by the individualist need for survival. Hobbes’ empiricist theory of morality presented humans as motivated by self-interest, stemming from his view of humans constantly striv- ing to satisfy their own selfish desires, of which the main desire was, of necessity, survival.
Hobbes retained some notion of natural law, which for him amounted to the ability to exercise freedom in placing one’s own interests above that of another, thus generating competition and the opportunity for exploitation. To prevent this outcome, Hobbes argued that human beings, despite being governed by subjective preferences and their own self-interest would, through means– ends reasoning, recognize certain common interests. These, he believed, would be adopted in order for individuals to maximize their own security. Thus Hobbes arrived at a list of natural laws, of which the last was, interestingly enough, the Golden Rule. ‘The Lawes of Nature therefore need not any publishing nor Proclamation; as being contained in this one Sentence, approved by all the world, Do not that to another, which thou thinketh unreasonable to be done by another to thy selfe’ (Hobbes [1651]
Altruism: a brief history 9
1996: 109). In contrast to Christian ethicists, for whom the
Golden Rule was altruistic, Hobbes grounded it in the overriding
need to secure one’s own interests. It is questionable whether this
is an expression of altruism. This is because the motivational
reasons why people act so as to treat another’s interests as their
own in Hobbes’s Golden Rule is quite different from that than in
earlier treatments. When read in the context of the preceding laws
of nature, the emphasis is on how I would want to be treated
rather than how I treat the other. One treats the other person in
order to elicit (on grounds of reciprocity) one’s preferred treat-
ment from them. Hobbes’s view is thus thoroughly egoistic. This
is evident from his definition of a law of nature; it is a rule
according to which a person is forbidden to do anything that is
self-destructive or removes their ability to preserve their own life
(Hobbes [1651] 1996: 91). The negative aspect of the expression
is different from the Biblical expression, reading ‘do not that to
another’, rather than ‘do unto others’. In other words, do not do
anything to others that you wouldn’t want done to you; the things
that you would have done to you being those things that secure
your own survival. It is a rule that is to be understood in the
context of the overriding goal of securing one’s own interests.
The Golden Rule can therefore be read as the expression of a
reciprocal ethic rather than a purely altruistic one.
Hobbes’ egoism was opposed by Richard Cumberland, who wanted to return the ethics of natural law back to the Christian tradition. Cumberland believed that Hobbes made an error in his assumption that the object of every person’s will is what one thinks is good for themselves. Hobbes presumes that everyone pursues their own good, and that justice and peace are accidental pursuits (Cumberland 1672). In other words, according to Cum- berland, Hobbes fails to recognize the pursuit of good for the sake of others, a good that is not self-directed. In Hobbes’s theory it is only accidental that peace and justice emerge in the securing of good for oneself. Cumberland’s own view supports a view of human nature where reason, understood in a substantive sense, is central, and where morality is grounded in human rational abil- ities, rather than the emotions. For Cumberland, the rational gives rise to the moral, which for him was understood as the discovery of the laws of nature.
Samuel Pufendorf wrote a more detailed defence of an altruis- tic attitude towards others following on from Cumberland, in his
Hobbes’ egoism was opposed by Richard Cumberland, who wanted to return the ethics of natural law back to the Christian tradition. Cumberland believed that Hobbes made an error in his assumption that the object of every person’s will is what one thinks is good for themselves. Hobbes presumes that everyone pursues their own good, and that justice and peace are accidental pursuits (Cumberland 1672). In other words, according to Cum- berland, Hobbes fails to recognize the pursuit of good for the sake of others, a good that is not self-directed. In Hobbes’s theory it is only accidental that peace and justice emerge in the securing of good for oneself. Cumberland’s own view supports a view of human nature where reason, understood in a substantive sense, is central, and where morality is grounded in human rational abil- ities, rather than the emotions. For Cumberland, the rational gives rise to the moral, which for him was understood as the discovery of the laws of nature.
Samuel Pufendorf wrote a more detailed defence of an altruis- tic attitude towards others following on from Cumberland, in his
10 Altruism
‘The Duty of Man and Citizen’, in which the human tendency
towards selfish behaviour is counteracted by human social living
where various duties to others are to be upheld. These included,
under the specific heading of ‘Common duties of Humanity’, the
duty:
that every man promote the advantage of the other, so far as he conveniently can. For since nature has established a kind of kinship among men, it would not be enough to have refrained from injuring or despising others; but we must also bestow such attentions upon others – or mutually exchange them – that thus mutual benevolence may be fostered among men. Now we benefit others either defi- nitely or indefinitely, and that with a loss or else without loss to ourselves.
(Pufendorf [1673] 1991: bk.I, ch.VIII)
Here we have a clear expression of altruism, combining ideas of taking the interests of the other as one’s own, together with the idea of mutual aid and, more significantly, together with the likelihood that taking others’ interests as one’s own will involve some cost to oneself.
Christian Wolff, whose 1738 work, Philosophia Practica Uni- versalis was referred to by Kant in the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant [1785] 1996: 46), held that duties towards others were the same as duties towards oneself, an idea that not only revisits the expression of the Golden Rule as it appears in the Gospels, but also St. John’s exhortation that one is to love others as oneself (Wolff 1720: 796). Wolff emphasizes the obligation to help those who are in need, insofar as one is capable of doing so, what they are limited by their situation and ability. This duty does not extend to putting oneself in danger. Wolff expresses this clearly in his reflections on rendering assistance. The ethic of the good Samaritan, however praiseworthy, does not extend to failing to meet the duties one owes to one’s self:
The utility of these rules is great and extensive. For through them we can judge in all cases whether or not we are obligated to help someone. For example we see a man on the road that has been attacked by a robber, who is robbing him and trying to kill him. We are by nature
that every man promote the advantage of the other, so far as he conveniently can. For since nature has established a kind of kinship among men, it would not be enough to have refrained from injuring or despising others; but we must also bestow such attentions upon others – or mutually exchange them – that thus mutual benevolence may be fostered among men. Now we benefit others either defi- nitely or indefinitely, and that with a loss or else without loss to ourselves.
(Pufendorf [1673] 1991: bk.I, ch.VIII)
Here we have a clear expression of altruism, combining ideas of taking the interests of the other as one’s own, together with the idea of mutual aid and, more significantly, together with the likelihood that taking others’ interests as one’s own will involve some cost to oneself.
Christian Wolff, whose 1738 work, Philosophia Practica Uni- versalis was referred to by Kant in the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant [1785] 1996: 46), held that duties towards others were the same as duties towards oneself, an idea that not only revisits the expression of the Golden Rule as it appears in the Gospels, but also St. John’s exhortation that one is to love others as oneself (Wolff 1720: 796). Wolff emphasizes the obligation to help those who are in need, insofar as one is capable of doing so, what they are limited by their situation and ability. This duty does not extend to putting oneself in danger. Wolff expresses this clearly in his reflections on rendering assistance. The ethic of the good Samaritan, however praiseworthy, does not extend to failing to meet the duties one owes to one’s self:
The utility of these rules is great and extensive. For through them we can judge in all cases whether or not we are obligated to help someone. For example we see a man on the road that has been attacked by a robber, who is robbing him and trying to kill him. We are by nature
Altruism: a brief history 11
fearful and weak and, consequently unfit to protect anyone.
We must therefore be aware that if we intervened we
would not save the victim but we would be put in danger
with him. Because we as well as the other are obligated to
avoid all danger to life, and it is not in our power to run to
his aid, we are not obligated to do so. One obligation
cannot be opposed by another.
(Wolff 1720: 772)
For Wolff, sacrificial altruism has its limits, a stipulation which to a modern reader is perfectly sensible. Furthermore, although Wolff promotes the obligation of a person to love others as they love themselves, he insists on an unequal distribution of this love: ‘Works of love are called benefits, and accordingly friends strive to benefit us. Because we are obligated to love all men as ourselves, we owe most love to those who benefit us. The love of the benefactor is called gratitude, and so we should be grateful to our benefactor’ (Wolff 1720: 834). This bias towards benefactors introduces, among other difficulties, the question of what one ought to do if a stranger’s need is more pressing than that of a benefactor, a viewpoint which raises problems for more impartial understandings of morality and justice.
Immanuel Kant pays compliment to Wolff’s contribution to ethics, noting at the beginning of the Groundwork to the Meta- physics of Morals that the idea of a universal practical philosophy, which he sought to defend, had already been formulated by Wolff. In the Groundwork, Kant sets out to find a justification for morality grounded in reason. He does this through a complex argument that shows the possibility of a fundamental universal principle for morality, called the categorical imperative. This imperative, he maintained, was the ‘supreme principle of moral- ity’ (Kant [1785] 1996: 47), and it was expressed in several forms in the Groundwork. Kant sought to trace the motive for pure moral behaviour in a way which avoided reliance on empirical sources, such as feelings or desires. The latter, however, includes much of what we today would consider to be involved in altruistic behaviour.
Kant considered acting to benefit others in need as a moral duty and in the Groundwork he introduces beneficence (doing good to others) as an example of a categorical morality, universally binding on all rational agents. In Kant’s terms, this means that all
(Wolff 1720: 772)
For Wolff, sacrificial altruism has its limits, a stipulation which to a modern reader is perfectly sensible. Furthermore, although Wolff promotes the obligation of a person to love others as they love themselves, he insists on an unequal distribution of this love: ‘Works of love are called benefits, and accordingly friends strive to benefit us. Because we are obligated to love all men as ourselves, we owe most love to those who benefit us. The love of the benefactor is called gratitude, and so we should be grateful to our benefactor’ (Wolff 1720: 834). This bias towards benefactors introduces, among other difficulties, the question of what one ought to do if a stranger’s need is more pressing than that of a benefactor, a viewpoint which raises problems for more impartial understandings of morality and justice.
Immanuel Kant pays compliment to Wolff’s contribution to ethics, noting at the beginning of the Groundwork to the Meta- physics of Morals that the idea of a universal practical philosophy, which he sought to defend, had already been formulated by Wolff. In the Groundwork, Kant sets out to find a justification for morality grounded in reason. He does this through a complex argument that shows the possibility of a fundamental universal principle for morality, called the categorical imperative. This imperative, he maintained, was the ‘supreme principle of moral- ity’ (Kant [1785] 1996: 47), and it was expressed in several forms in the Groundwork. Kant sought to trace the motive for pure moral behaviour in a way which avoided reliance on empirical sources, such as feelings or desires. The latter, however, includes much of what we today would consider to be involved in altruistic behaviour.
Kant considered acting to benefit others in need as a moral duty and in the Groundwork he introduces beneficence (doing good to others) as an example of a categorical morality, universally binding on all rational agents. In Kant’s terms, this means that all
12 Altruism
rational beings would agree to the principle that one has a moral
duty to be beneficent to others. Beneficence was a moral duty
because humans can find themselves in a position where they
require assistance from others who have the capacity to help. The
rationale behind acting according to the duty of beneficence is
that it would be irrational to adopt non-beneficence towards
others as a universal principle, as this would mean that such an
individual ought to be willing to forgo help from others when
they themselves are in a position of need. It is important to note
that Kant’s position gives moral reason a central role in motiva-
tion. This contrasts strongly with the approach taken by the
empiricist tradition, where it is accepted that human sentiment
has normative force; reason, in other words, can motivate us to
act, right moral values are expressed in and through our acting.
We will return to this contrast below when we look at the notion
of motivation.
The empiricist tradition and early evolutionary thought
The development of the empiricist tradition in England saw the ethics of love for one’s neighbour that came through the Christian tradition meet the ethics of emotion, on the one hand, and a rational ethics on the other. We have already encountered empiri- cism in Hobbes where the fear of death and a means–ends conception of reasoning were together a non-metaphysical basis for the foundation of political society. This meeting led to a new understanding of morality and – important for our purposes – altruistic morality. This was expressed by Lord Shaftesbury (1977) for example, who held that morality was a development of feeling and, following him, Hutcheson who believed that humans had a moral sense, which involved the use of sentiment rather than reason in producing moral judgements. This new way of thinking about morality, in terms of emotions, brought it closer to altruistic concerns.
Hume, developing his moral theory from Hutcheson, argued that sentiment was the basis of moral judgement. Hume devoted a substantial part of his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals to the subject of benevolence, providing from the outset a collection of terms associated with this moral sentiment which he thought expressed ‘the highest merit which human nature is capable of attaining’ (Hume [1777] 1975: 176). The terms he
The empiricist tradition and early evolutionary thought
The development of the empiricist tradition in England saw the ethics of love for one’s neighbour that came through the Christian tradition meet the ethics of emotion, on the one hand, and a rational ethics on the other. We have already encountered empiri- cism in Hobbes where the fear of death and a means–ends conception of reasoning were together a non-metaphysical basis for the foundation of political society. This meeting led to a new understanding of morality and – important for our purposes – altruistic morality. This was expressed by Lord Shaftesbury (1977) for example, who held that morality was a development of feeling and, following him, Hutcheson who believed that humans had a moral sense, which involved the use of sentiment rather than reason in producing moral judgements. This new way of thinking about morality, in terms of emotions, brought it closer to altruistic concerns.
Hume, developing his moral theory from Hutcheson, argued that sentiment was the basis of moral judgement. Hume devoted a substantial part of his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals to the subject of benevolence, providing from the outset a collection of terms associated with this moral sentiment which he thought expressed ‘the highest merit which human nature is capable of attaining’ (Hume [1777] 1975: 176). The terms he
Altruism: a brief history 13
cites are all forms of virtue: sociability, good naturedness,
humaneness, mercifulness, gratitude, friendliness, generosity and
beneficence. It is the last of these, beneficence, which reflects
altruism most clearly and (as we saw) is significant for Kant as
well. Hume saw the origins of moral sentiments as emerging
through familial and other social relationships. It was here that
humans cultivated the feelings of sympathy which were central to
motivating moral action. It was sympathy, according to Hume,
that allowed a person to transfer feelings from one person onto
another. (Hume [1739–40] 1888: 493). This emphasis on emotion
is important for the development of altruism, as it provides a
different account of the source of motivation. Rather than reason,
it is emotion and sentiment that provide the appropriate founda-
tion for altruistic morality. This position has been supported more
recently by Lawrence Blum, whom we will consider in the next
chapter. Important, too, is the relationship between emotion and
sentiment. Michael Ruse, an evolutionary ethicist, considers
Hume’s views on the origins of human morality to be very close
to Darwin’s. We will look at this in Chapter 3.
The eighteenth century Scottish economist and philosopher Adam Smith, a friend of Hume’s, took a very different view. Like Hobbes, he believed that egoism helped advance the common good. Specifically, if each person was allowed to pursue their own economic freedom, and thus advance their own interests, there would be a substantial economic gain overall and that general welfare would therefore be served. However, Smith considered Hobbes’ strict egoistic view of human nature to be overstated and argued, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, that: ‘How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives noth- ing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it’ (Smith [1790] 2002: 11). Thus Smith, like Hume, accepts that morality is grounded in sympathy, though as Maris points out, Smith interpreted sympa- thy as the ability of a person to imagine themselves in someone else’s position, whereas Hume saw sympathy as the principle by which it is possible for a person to transfer feelings to another person (Maris: 1981: 59).
However, Smith was aware that it is our own feelings we are imagining rather than the other person’s. Imagining oneself in the position of another does not necessarily lead to acting on that
The eighteenth century Scottish economist and philosopher Adam Smith, a friend of Hume’s, took a very different view. Like Hobbes, he believed that egoism helped advance the common good. Specifically, if each person was allowed to pursue their own economic freedom, and thus advance their own interests, there would be a substantial economic gain overall and that general welfare would therefore be served. However, Smith considered Hobbes’ strict egoistic view of human nature to be overstated and argued, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, that: ‘How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives noth- ing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it’ (Smith [1790] 2002: 11). Thus Smith, like Hume, accepts that morality is grounded in sympathy, though as Maris points out, Smith interpreted sympa- thy as the ability of a person to imagine themselves in someone else’s position, whereas Hume saw sympathy as the principle by which it is possible for a person to transfer feelings to another person (Maris: 1981: 59).
However, Smith was aware that it is our own feelings we are imagining rather than the other person’s. Imagining oneself in the position of another does not necessarily lead to acting on that
14 Altruism
imagining. For example, if I see someone experience pain, such
as twisting an ankle, I may imagine what that pain is like for me
to experience when I sympathize with the sufferer. One might
think that more than this is needed for a genuinely altruistic
response, namely, taking another’s interests as one’s own and
acting from another’s perspective. Maris argues that Smith distin-
guishes between altruism, which he regards as an uneven emotion
involving only those in close proximity, and other moral feelings
which are more equally distributed and allow objectification. The
latter are involved in moral phenomena, such as putting oneself in
another’s place or meeting one’s duty in action towards another.
Altruism, for Smith, expressed as self-sacrifice, is directed to
those who are close to us, and this is not the same as putting
oneself in the position of another. The latter involves moral
feeling and sympathy which is stronger than ‘the feeble spark of
benevolence’ (Smith [1790] 2002: 156). The stronger aspect
involves reason-principle conscience and the perspective of an
impartial observer, rather than the love of one’s neighbour.
Although altruism as a term was not in use at this time, it is interesting to note that the very characteristics of what one might consider to be an idea of altruism were held by Smith to be motivations involving reason and conscience: strong and reliable moral feelings that Smith does not associate with self-sacrifice. The source of other-regarding behaviour is not to be found in benevolence. These ideas mainly concern the problem of being able to take another person’s interest as one’s own and be motivated to act in a way that benefits the other, crucial ideas in any understanding of altruism. What is important, moreover, about the moral philosophies of Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume and Smith is that, although they have differing perspectives on individuals’ motivation, they all reject the idea, maintained by Kant among others, that morality has rational grounds. They therefore provide an intellectual setting for the emergence of the evolutionary approach to morality that was to come.
Auguste Comte
The meaning of altruism developed its content in the Jewish and, especially, the Christian tradition of ethics. It subsequently focused on the individual’s ability to be the source of altruistic motivation as empiricism came into its own. The more specific
Although altruism as a term was not in use at this time, it is interesting to note that the very characteristics of what one might consider to be an idea of altruism were held by Smith to be motivations involving reason and conscience: strong and reliable moral feelings that Smith does not associate with self-sacrifice. The source of other-regarding behaviour is not to be found in benevolence. These ideas mainly concern the problem of being able to take another person’s interest as one’s own and be motivated to act in a way that benefits the other, crucial ideas in any understanding of altruism. What is important, moreover, about the moral philosophies of Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume and Smith is that, although they have differing perspectives on individuals’ motivation, they all reject the idea, maintained by Kant among others, that morality has rational grounds. They therefore provide an intellectual setting for the emergence of the evolutionary approach to morality that was to come.
Auguste Comte
The meaning of altruism developed its content in the Jewish and, especially, the Christian tradition of ethics. It subsequently focused on the individual’s ability to be the source of altruistic motivation as empiricism came into its own. The more specific
Altruism: a brief history 15
modern meaning, however, appears in Auguste Comte, who was
responsible for coining the term ‘altruisme’ to refer to benevolent
and sympathetic feelings that, according to him, ought to be
promoted in place of more selfish ones. Whereas in the moral
philosophical tradition, consideration of others included duties to
God, to the community and to oneself, Comte wished to see
ethics develop only out of our social relationships. Altruism was
centrally about promoting other people’s interests, and morality
was the triumph of altruism over egoism. Comte saw the origins
of sympathy, socialization and altruism, in the animal world. With
the emergence in the mid-nineteenth century of a science of the
brain, Comte also believed that sympathy and altruism could be
shown to originate from specific areas of the brain.
The egoistic sentiments that are needed for survival were seen by Comte as stronger than the weaker altruistic and social capacities. These weaker capacities could, however, be strengthened through education; in the course of human evolution altruistic functions in the brain had became stronger and capable of controlling egoistic passions (Maris 1981). This view of the relationship between the egoistic instincts and altruistic tenden- cies meant that the goal of living for others in human social evolution was problematic; the capacities for intellect and altru- ism had to overcome the requirements of self-preservation. The reasons Comte develops to support this view are difficult and complex. He held that in the course of human evolution the natural predominance and supremacy of instinct is sacrificed to the higher development of reason. This brings about a ‘fatal separation’ between heart and mind that threatens the unity of man. Any attempt to separate altruism from egoism and promote only altruism would be disastrous for society, unless it had reached the requisite stage of development. If it had not, it would be difficult to distinguish a pure altruism from an altruism that helped promote the egoism of others (Comte [1852] 1966: vol. 1, para. 66).
The family was where altruism was first learnt and practised, a crucible for its subsequent transformation into a fully fledged moral and social phenomenon. However, although this is the first location of altruism, it is not fully developed in the family. Only later, and with a certain amount of abstraction, can altruism be pursued as a universal goal of humanity. This stage of moral development in society had not yet been reached, according to
The egoistic sentiments that are needed for survival were seen by Comte as stronger than the weaker altruistic and social capacities. These weaker capacities could, however, be strengthened through education; in the course of human evolution altruistic functions in the brain had became stronger and capable of controlling egoistic passions (Maris 1981). This view of the relationship between the egoistic instincts and altruistic tenden- cies meant that the goal of living for others in human social evolution was problematic; the capacities for intellect and altru- ism had to overcome the requirements of self-preservation. The reasons Comte develops to support this view are difficult and complex. He held that in the course of human evolution the natural predominance and supremacy of instinct is sacrificed to the higher development of reason. This brings about a ‘fatal separation’ between heart and mind that threatens the unity of man. Any attempt to separate altruism from egoism and promote only altruism would be disastrous for society, unless it had reached the requisite stage of development. If it had not, it would be difficult to distinguish a pure altruism from an altruism that helped promote the egoism of others (Comte [1852] 1966: vol. 1, para. 66).
The family was where altruism was first learnt and practised, a crucible for its subsequent transformation into a fully fledged moral and social phenomenon. However, although this is the first location of altruism, it is not fully developed in the family. Only later, and with a certain amount of abstraction, can altruism be pursued as a universal goal of humanity. This stage of moral development in society had not yet been reached, according to
16 Altruism
Comte; it would do so through education and the continued
co-operation between the intellect and altruistic feelings. The
result is a civilization that is, in general, characterized by the
continuous removal of all personal (self-interested) and egocen-
tric tendencies, and one which adopts altruism as the behaviour
that cements social relationships.
There is a move, then, from the level of the individual to the family that was the focus of both the Kantian and the empiricist view, where altruistic tendencies were thought to function as a foundation for living in society (Comte [1852] 1966: vol. 3, para. 69). Eventually, thought Comte, a spontaneous, natural, innate altruism (Comte [1851] 1969–70: vol. 3, para. 589; vol. 4, para. 20) would come about, as human beings, through the evolution of thought, were able to assert the superiority of intellect over emotion, and altruism over egoism in their inclinations. This development is, according to Comte, ‘less easy to realise than the egotistical unity’, because of the effort required by the intellect and is therefore, once arrived at, ‘superior to wealth and stability’ (Comte [1852] 1966: vol. 2, para. 9) in making human social relationships secure. The evolution of altruism involves the subor- dination of self-love to meeting the needs of others, and this is a source of well-being for the individual as well as for society at large. Altruism is only able to operate successfully in the face of a strong egoistic instinct when it works hand in hand with human rational capacity. This capacity provides a rational insight into social negotiation, where the rational encounters human needs. On its own, intellect and rationality lead to vanity, but when encountering human needs in the social context, the intellect is put to use to serve human needs, serving this best through the practice of altruism (Comte [1852] 1966: vol. 1, para. 700; vol. 2, para. 204). This evolved altruistic morality that Comte saw as becoming universal to all humanity.
Herbert Spencer expressed similar thoughts on altruism to Comte, apart from the fact that, in the context of increasing interest in Darwinian ideas on natural selection, Spencer looked on evolution as a physical process. Social Darwinism, introduced into the intellectual landscape by Spencer, read Darwin’s theories of natural selection as a way in which the evolutionary process could involve the moral betterment of human beings through the development of altruism, followed by its disappearance as it became redundant. Spencer avoided the radical approach of
There is a move, then, from the level of the individual to the family that was the focus of both the Kantian and the empiricist view, where altruistic tendencies were thought to function as a foundation for living in society (Comte [1852] 1966: vol. 3, para. 69). Eventually, thought Comte, a spontaneous, natural, innate altruism (Comte [1851] 1969–70: vol. 3, para. 589; vol. 4, para. 20) would come about, as human beings, through the evolution of thought, were able to assert the superiority of intellect over emotion, and altruism over egoism in their inclinations. This development is, according to Comte, ‘less easy to realise than the egotistical unity’, because of the effort required by the intellect and is therefore, once arrived at, ‘superior to wealth and stability’ (Comte [1852] 1966: vol. 2, para. 9) in making human social relationships secure. The evolution of altruism involves the subor- dination of self-love to meeting the needs of others, and this is a source of well-being for the individual as well as for society at large. Altruism is only able to operate successfully in the face of a strong egoistic instinct when it works hand in hand with human rational capacity. This capacity provides a rational insight into social negotiation, where the rational encounters human needs. On its own, intellect and rationality lead to vanity, but when encountering human needs in the social context, the intellect is put to use to serve human needs, serving this best through the practice of altruism (Comte [1852] 1966: vol. 1, para. 700; vol. 2, para. 204). This evolved altruistic morality that Comte saw as becoming universal to all humanity.
Herbert Spencer expressed similar thoughts on altruism to Comte, apart from the fact that, in the context of increasing interest in Darwinian ideas on natural selection, Spencer looked on evolution as a physical process. Social Darwinism, introduced into the intellectual landscape by Spencer, read Darwin’s theories of natural selection as a way in which the evolutionary process could involve the moral betterment of human beings through the development of altruism, followed by its disappearance as it became redundant. Spencer avoided the radical approach of
Altruism: a brief history 17
Comte, since he believed that Comte’s pure, familial altruism
would lead down a path to an individual’s ever increasing depend-
ence on the community, this being contrary to his stress on the
individual as the motor of human evolution. Spencer’s approach,
unlike Comte’s, was individualist and Spencer regarded egoism
as having priority over altruism. ‘That egoism precedes altruism
in order of imperativeness is evident. For the acts that make
continued life possible, must, on the average be more peremptory
than all those acts which life makes possible, including the acts
that benefit others’ (Collins 1895: ch.11, sec.68).
Egoism and its related acts, in being peremptory, provide an imperative demanding compliance with those forces that make the continuation of life possible. Spencer defined altruism simply as action that benefits others instead of benefiting oneself. He presented a utilitarian form of altruism that can be seen as coming through the English empirical tradition in moral philosophy, having as its predecessor a restricted egoism (Spencer 1879: ch. 1, para. 69; 1872: chs. 1, 7, 9). For Spencer, pure egoism and pure altruism are harmful to man in that they do not secure the utilitarian aim of the greatest happiness. The principle of loving one’s neighbour as oneself, he argued, requires one to be simulta- neously egoistic and altruistic – the willingness to receive injury to self for the other’s benefit and the expectation that the other accepts benefits at the cost of injury to others leads to traits that Spencer thought could not co-exist (Collins 1895: bk. XII. sec.82–9). The commitment to self-sacrifice, which altruism involved, is incompatible with Spencer’s commitment to the survival of the fittest in his evolutionary theory. The strength exhibited by the egoist allows superior organisms to progress biologically. Altruism is beneficial, though, because of what it gives socially in aiding reproductive success through social life, it is important in economic relationships and provides humans with pleasure. Ultimately egoism and altruism are to be reconciled to one another in the process of human evolution.
The conflict between egoism and altruism is, however, only transitional and eventually, according to Spencer, they became more harmoniously related, as in the industrial society where each person works for all, and when the individual’s needs and interests coincide with the laws of the market. Evolution was the principle behind Spencer’s social philosophy, and he believed that man would adapt fully to his social situation since he would be
Egoism and its related acts, in being peremptory, provide an imperative demanding compliance with those forces that make the continuation of life possible. Spencer defined altruism simply as action that benefits others instead of benefiting oneself. He presented a utilitarian form of altruism that can be seen as coming through the English empirical tradition in moral philosophy, having as its predecessor a restricted egoism (Spencer 1879: ch. 1, para. 69; 1872: chs. 1, 7, 9). For Spencer, pure egoism and pure altruism are harmful to man in that they do not secure the utilitarian aim of the greatest happiness. The principle of loving one’s neighbour as oneself, he argued, requires one to be simulta- neously egoistic and altruistic – the willingness to receive injury to self for the other’s benefit and the expectation that the other accepts benefits at the cost of injury to others leads to traits that Spencer thought could not co-exist (Collins 1895: bk. XII. sec.82–9). The commitment to self-sacrifice, which altruism involved, is incompatible with Spencer’s commitment to the survival of the fittest in his evolutionary theory. The strength exhibited by the egoist allows superior organisms to progress biologically. Altruism is beneficial, though, because of what it gives socially in aiding reproductive success through social life, it is important in economic relationships and provides humans with pleasure. Ultimately egoism and altruism are to be reconciled to one another in the process of human evolution.
The conflict between egoism and altruism is, however, only transitional and eventually, according to Spencer, they became more harmoniously related, as in the industrial society where each person works for all, and when the individual’s needs and interests coincide with the laws of the market. Evolution was the principle behind Spencer’s social philosophy, and he believed that man would adapt fully to his social situation since he would be
18 Altruism
eradicated if he did not keep pace. Eventually, altruism would no
longer be necessary, because, in the perfect community all are
simultaneously required to maintain themselves and to fulfil
completely all the obligations on which the community is based
in order to keep it in good working order (Spencer 1879: ch.1,
para. 80). Altruism becomes obsolete because the needs of the
individual are most fully realized in a society where self-interest
coincides with the interests of all. Altruism here is still a ‘sympa-
thetic pacification which each receives as a free addition to their
egoistic pleasures’ (Spencer 1879: ch.1, para. 98), for example, in
the bringing up of young by the family, altruism reverts to taking
pleasure in other people’s happiness.
From Nietzsche to some modern views on altruism
Nietzsche criticized Spencer’s evolutionary theory heavily, together with the British empiricist tradition, referring to social Darwinists as ‘these English psychologists’. Of them, he states: ‘The way they have bungled their moral genealogy comes to light at the very beginning where the task is to investigate the origin of the concept and judgement “good”’ (Nietzsche [1910] 1992: 461). Nietzsche saw neither altruism nor the development of social relationships as a levelling co-operation system in which the meaning of human development could be found, but rather looked to the individual. He was particularly interested in altru- ism for he saw it as a psychological weakness in human beings. Altruism, for Nietzsche, was the most hypocritical form of ego- ism, grounded in resentment of others’ success (Nietzsche [1901] 1968). The altruistic person used their own low self-worth to measure the value of others’ activities (Nietzsche [1901] 1968).
Nietzsche encountered altruism through Spencer’s hypothesis, which treated human beings as the most advanced Darwinian animal, able to cope with the demands of altruism and egoism in a skilful manner. Spencer’s altruism, which keeps an element of egoism in place, is also read by Nietzsche as coming from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Nietzsche condemns it because of what it brings about: the removal of the self at the expense of an obsession with the other. This critical perspective on morality is contained in his resentment thesis in The Genealogy of Morals, but he also explicitly criticizes altruism elsewhere. In his essay ‘Daybreak’, Nietzsche sees the cause of altruism in the poetic
From Nietzsche to some modern views on altruism
Nietzsche criticized Spencer’s evolutionary theory heavily, together with the British empiricist tradition, referring to social Darwinists as ‘these English psychologists’. Of them, he states: ‘The way they have bungled their moral genealogy comes to light at the very beginning where the task is to investigate the origin of the concept and judgement “good”’ (Nietzsche [1910] 1992: 461). Nietzsche saw neither altruism nor the development of social relationships as a levelling co-operation system in which the meaning of human development could be found, but rather looked to the individual. He was particularly interested in altru- ism for he saw it as a psychological weakness in human beings. Altruism, for Nietzsche, was the most hypocritical form of ego- ism, grounded in resentment of others’ success (Nietzsche [1901] 1968). The altruistic person used their own low self-worth to measure the value of others’ activities (Nietzsche [1901] 1968).
Nietzsche encountered altruism through Spencer’s hypothesis, which treated human beings as the most advanced Darwinian animal, able to cope with the demands of altruism and egoism in a skilful manner. Spencer’s altruism, which keeps an element of egoism in place, is also read by Nietzsche as coming from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Nietzsche condemns it because of what it brings about: the removal of the self at the expense of an obsession with the other. This critical perspective on morality is contained in his resentment thesis in The Genealogy of Morals, but he also explicitly criticizes altruism elsewhere. In his essay ‘Daybreak’, Nietzsche sees the cause of altruism in the poetic
Altruism: a brief history 19
interest of those who have lacked the experience of love and thus
construct a mistaken idolized context in which this love can occur
(Nietzsche [1881] 1982: bk. II, para. 147). He sees the individual
who is ‘unegoistic’ as one who ‘is hollow and wants to be full’ or
‘one who is overfull and wants to be emptied – both go in search
of an individual who will serve their purpose’ (Nietzsche [1881]
1982: bk. II, para. 145), which is to find a love that is unegoistic.
For Nietzsche, the tendency to think of others and not oneself comes from a sense of pity. The interest in someone else’s plight or in their suffering is motivated by an unconscious reflection on what our own suffering would be. On rescuing behaviour he writes: ‘Let us reflect seriously upon this question: why do we leap after someone who has fallen into the water in front of us, even though we feel no kind of affection for him? Out of pity: at that moment we are thinking only of the other person’ (Nietzsche [1881] 1982: bk. II, para. 133). But if we reflect upon this at a deeper level, according to Nietzsche, we will see that our action is really motivated by self-interest even if we may not be conscious of this at the time. We act to help a person in need in order to relieve ourselves of the feeling of pity: ‘But it is only this suffering of our own which we get rid of when we perform deeds of pity’ (Nietzsche [1881] 1982: bk. II, para. 133). Nietzsche is starkly opposed to altruism and any other morality that involves taking the other as the focus of an action over and above the self.
Max Scheler supported Nietzsche’s resentment thesis in terms of contemporary values, but opposed Nietzsche’s historical read- ing of Christianity as being rooted in resentment (Schroeder 2000). According to Scheler, the love of others, that the Christian perspective is interested in, flows from their own life force; man loves the other not for their own ends or out of weakness, but because of positive values. Altruists end up fleeing from the fear of self and view themselves as less worthy (Scheler 1954). This is because, according to Scheler, altruism cannot answer the ques- tion: why am I or why will I not be worthy of a positive value of love from the other? In other words, it does not comprehend the value of reciprocation.
Modern ideas of altruism have taken two different courses after the advent of evolutionary theory. First, in evolutionary thought the term has been used to refer to some specific consequences of animal behaviour, ignoring the intentions or the motivations behind it. Second, altruism has remained a term applied to
For Nietzsche, the tendency to think of others and not oneself comes from a sense of pity. The interest in someone else’s plight or in their suffering is motivated by an unconscious reflection on what our own suffering would be. On rescuing behaviour he writes: ‘Let us reflect seriously upon this question: why do we leap after someone who has fallen into the water in front of us, even though we feel no kind of affection for him? Out of pity: at that moment we are thinking only of the other person’ (Nietzsche [1881] 1982: bk. II, para. 133). But if we reflect upon this at a deeper level, according to Nietzsche, we will see that our action is really motivated by self-interest even if we may not be conscious of this at the time. We act to help a person in need in order to relieve ourselves of the feeling of pity: ‘But it is only this suffering of our own which we get rid of when we perform deeds of pity’ (Nietzsche [1881] 1982: bk. II, para. 133). Nietzsche is starkly opposed to altruism and any other morality that involves taking the other as the focus of an action over and above the self.
Max Scheler supported Nietzsche’s resentment thesis in terms of contemporary values, but opposed Nietzsche’s historical read- ing of Christianity as being rooted in resentment (Schroeder 2000). According to Scheler, the love of others, that the Christian perspective is interested in, flows from their own life force; man loves the other not for their own ends or out of weakness, but because of positive values. Altruists end up fleeing from the fear of self and view themselves as less worthy (Scheler 1954). This is because, according to Scheler, altruism cannot answer the ques- tion: why am I or why will I not be worthy of a positive value of love from the other? In other words, it does not comprehend the value of reciprocation.
Modern ideas of altruism have taken two different courses after the advent of evolutionary theory. First, in evolutionary thought the term has been used to refer to some specific consequences of animal behaviour, ignoring the intentions or the motivations behind it. Second, altruism has remained a term applied to
20 Altruism
other-regarding behaviour, ranging from the self-sacrificial to
merely the taking on of others’ ends as one’s own. The latter, as
we have seen, has a long history in moral philosophy. There is
considerable debate over both these positions. The latter view,
where the motive and intention are of importance are of particular
interest to us in this book, but we shall consider the evolutionary
perspective (in Chapter 3) too, as it informs many current debates.
Through this survey of the phenomenon of altruism, not only has it become evident that there are multiple understandings of the term, but the phenomenon of promoting the value of others has been of some considerable moment in the history of ideas. The question of the meaning of altruism has arisen in many contexts and against a background of quite different views of human beings. A key divide seems to be the question of whether humans are altruists by virtue of their use of reason or through their emotions.
Through this survey of the phenomenon of altruism, not only has it become evident that there are multiple understandings of the term, but the phenomenon of promoting the value of others has been of some considerable moment in the history of ideas. The question of the meaning of altruism has arisen in many contexts and against a background of quite different views of human beings. A key divide seems to be the question of whether humans are altruists by virtue of their use of reason or through their emotions.
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